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Abstract
We present the first differentially private algorithms for reinforcement learning, which apply
to the task of evaluating a fixed policy. We establish two approaches for achieving differential
privacy, provide a theoretical analysis of the privacy and utility of the two algorithms, and show
promising results on simple empirical examples.
1 Introduction
Learning how to make decisions under uncertainty is becoming paramount in many practical ap-
plications, such as medical treatment design, energy management, adaptive user interfaces, rec-
ommender systems etc. Reinforcement learning [Sutton and Barto, 1998] provides a variety of
algorithms capable of handling such tasks. However, in many practical applications, aside from
obtaining good predictive performance, one might also require that the data used to learn the
predictor be kept confidential. This is especially true in medical applications, where patient confi-
dentiality is very important, and in other applications which are user-centric (such as recommender
systems). Differential privacy (DP) [Dwork, 2006] is a very active research area, originating from
cryptography, but which has now been embraced by the machine learning community. DP is a
formal model of privacy used to design mechanisms that reduce the amount of information leaked
by the result of queries to a database containing sensitive information about multiple users [Dwork,
2006]. Many supervised learning algorithms have differentially private versions, including logis-
tic regression [Chaudhuri and Monteleoni, 2009, Chaudhuri et al., 2011], support vector machines
[Chaudhuri et al., 2011, Rubinstein et al., 2012, Jain and Thakurta, 2013], and the lasso [Thakurta
and Smith, 2013]. However, differential privacy for reinforcement learning tasks has not been tack-
led yet, except for the simpler case of bandit problems [Smith and Thakurta, 2013, Mishra and
Thakurta, 2015, Tossou and Dimitrakakis, 2016].
In this paper, we tackle differential privacy for reinforcement learning algorithms for the full
Markov Decision Process (MDP) setting. We develop differentially private algorithms for the prob-
lem of policy evaluation, in which a given way of behaving has to be evaluated quantitatively. We
start with the batch, first-visit Monte Carlo approach to policy evaluation, which is well understood
and closest to regression algorithms, and provide two differentially private versions, which come
with formal privacy proofs as well as guarantees on the quality of the solution obtained. Both
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algorithms work by injecting Gaussian noise into the parameters vector for the value functions, but
they differ in the definition of the noise amount. Our privacy analysis techniques are related to
previous output perturbation for empirical risk minimization (ERM), but there are some domain
specific challenges that need to be addressed. Our utility analysis identifies parameters of the MDP
that control how easy it is to maintain privacy in each case. The theoretical utility analysis, as well
as some illustrative experiments, show that the accuracy of the private algorithms does not suffer
(compared to usual Monte Carlo) when the data set is large.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we provide background notation and
results on differential privacy and Monte Carlo methods for policy evaluation. Sec. 3 presents our
proposed algorithms. The privacy analysis and the utility analysis are outlined in Sec. 4 and Sec. 5
respectively. Detailed proofs for both of these sections are given in the Supplementary Material. In
Sec. 6 we provide empirical illustrations of the scaling behaviour of the proposal algorithms, using
synthetic MDPs, which try to mimic characteristics of real applications. Finally, we conclude in
Sec. 7 with a discussion of related work and avenues for future work.
2 Background
In this section we provide background on differential privacy and policy evaluation from Monte
Carlo estimates.
2.1 Differential Privacy
DP takes a user-centric approach, by providing privacy guarantees based on the difference of the
outputs of a learning algorithm trained on two databases differing in a single user. The central goal
is to bound the loss in privacy that a user can suffer when the result of an analysis on a database
with her data is made public. This can incentivize users to participate in studies using sensitive
data, e.g. mining of medical records. In the context of machine learning, differentially private
algorithms are useful because they allow learning models in such a way that their parameters do
not reveal information about the training data [McSherry and Talwar, 2007]. For example, one
can think of using historical medical records to learn prognostic and diagnostic models which can
then be shared between multiple health service providers without compromising the privacy of the
patients whose data was used to train the model.
To formalize the above discussion, let X be an input space and Y an output space. Suppose A is
a randomized algorithm that takes as input a tuple X = (x1, . . . , xm) of elements from X for some
m ≥ 1 and outputs a (random) element A(X) of Y. We interpret X ∈ Xm as a dataset containing
data from m individuals and define its neighbouring datasets as those that differ from X in their
last1 element: X ′ = (x1, . . . , xm−1, x′m) with xm 6= x′m. We denote this (symmetric) relation by
X ' X ′. A is (ε, δ)-differentially private for some ε, δ > 0 if for every m ≥ 1, every pair of datasets
X,X ′ ∈ Xm, X ' X ′, and every measurable set Ω ⊆ Y we have
P[A(X) ∈ Ω] ≤ eεP[A(X ′) ∈ Ω] + δ . (1)
1Formally, we should define neighbouring datasets as those which differ in one element, not necessarily the last.
But we are implicitly assuming here that the order of the elements in X does not affect the distribution of A(X),
so we can assume without loss of generality that the difference between neighbouring datasets is always in the last
element.
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This definition means that the distribution over possible outputs of A on inputs X and X ′ is very
similar, so revealing this output leaks almost no information on whether xm or x
′
m was in the
dataset.
A simple way to design a DP algorithm for a given function f : Xm → Y is the output per-
turbation mechanism, which releases A(X) = f(X) + η, where η is noise sampled from a properly
calibrated distribution. For real outputs Y = Rd, the Laplace (resp. Gaussian) mechanism (see e.g.
Dwork and Roth [2014]) samples each component of the noise η = (η1, . . . , ηd) i.i.d. from a Laplace
(resp. Gaussian) distribution with standard deviation O(GS1(f)/ε) (resp. O(GS2(f) ln(1/δ)/ε)),
where GSp(f) is the global sensitivity of f given by
GSp(f) = sup
X,X′∈Xm,X'X′
‖f(X)− f(X ′)‖p .
Calibrating noise to the global sensitivity is a worst-case approach that requires taking the supre-
mum over all possible pairs of neighbouring datasets, and in general does not account for the fact
that in some datasets privacy can be achieved with substantially smaller perturbations. In fact,
for many applications (like the one we consider in this paper) the global sensitivity is too large
to provide useful mechanisms. Ideally one would like to add perturbations proportional to the
potential changes around the input dataset X, as measured, for example by the local sensitivity
LSp(f,X) = supX′'X ‖f(X)− f(X ′)‖p. Nissim et al. [2007] showed that approaches based on LSp
do not lead to differentially private algorithms, and then proposed an alternative framework for DP
mechanisms with data-dependent perturbations based on the idea of smoothed sensitivity. This is
the approach we use in this paper; see Section 4 for further details.
2.2 Policy Evaluation
Policy evaluation is the problem of obtaining (an approximation to) the value function of a Markov
reward process defined by an MDP M and a policy pi [Sutton and Barto, 1998, Szepesva´ri, 2010]. In
many cases of interest M is unknown but we have access to trajectories containing state transitions
and immediate rewards sampled from pi. When the state space of M is relatively small, tabular
methods that represent the value of each state can be used individually. However, in problems
with large (or even continuous) state spaces, parametric representations for the value function are
typically needed in order to defeat the curse of dimensionality and exploit the fact that similar
states will have similar values. In this paper we focus on policy evaluation with linear function
approximation in the batch case, where we have access to a set of trajectories sampled from the
policy of interest.
Let M be an MDP over a finite state space S with N = |S| and pi a policy on M . Given
an initial state s0 ∈ S, the interaction of pi with M is described by a sequence ((st, at, rt))t≥0 of
state–action–reward triplets. Suppose 0 < γ < 1 is the discount factor of M . The value function
V pi : S → R of pi assigns to each state the expected discounted cumulative reward obtained by a
trajectory following policy pi from that state:
V pi(s) = EM,pi
[∑
t≥0 γ
trt
∣∣∣ s0 = s ] . (2)
The value function can be considered a vector V pi ∈ RS . We make the usual assumption that any
reward r generated by M is bounded: 0 ≤ r ≤ Rmax, so 0 ≤ V pi(s) ≤ Rmax/(1− γ) for all s ∈ S.
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Let Φ ∈ RS×d be a feature representation that associates each state s ∈ S to a d-dimensional
feature vector φ>s = Φ(s, :) ∈ Rd. The goal is to find a parameter vector θ ∈ Rd such that
Vˆ pi = Φθ is a good approximation to V pi. To do so, we assume that we have access to a collection
X = (x1, . . . , xm) of finite trajectories sampled from M by pi, where each xi is a sequence of states,
actions and rewards.
We will use a Monte Carlo approach, in which the returns of the trajectories in X are used
as regression targets to fit the parameters in Vˆ pi via a least squares approach [Sutton and Barto,
1998]. In particular, we consider first-visit Monte Carlo estimates obtained as follows. Suppose
x = ((s1, a1, r1), . . . , (sT , aT , rT )) is a trajectory that visits s and ix,s is the time of the first visit to
s; that is, six,s = s, and st 6= s for all t < ix,s. The return collected from this first visit is given by
Fx,s =
T∑
t=ix,s
rtγ
t−ix,s =
T−ix,s∑
t=0
rt+ix,sγ
t ,
and provides an unbiased estimate of V pi(s). For convenience, when state s is not visited by
trajectory x we assume Fx,s = 0.
Given the returns from all first visits corresponding to a dataset X with m trajectories, we can
find a parameter vector for the estimator Vˆ pi by solving the optimization problem argminθ JX(θ),
where
JX(θ) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
∑
s∈Sxi
ρs(Fxi,s − φ>s θ)2 , (3)
and Sx is the set of states visited by trajectory x. The regression weights 0 ≤ ρs ≤ 1 are given
as an input to the problem and capture the user’s believe that some states are more relevant than
others. It is obvious that JX(θ) is a convex function of θ. However, in general it is not strongly
convex and therefore the optimum of argminθ JX(θ) is not necessarily unique. On the other hand,
it is known that differential privacy is tightly related to certain notions of stability [Thakurta and
Smith, 2013], and optimization problems with non-unique solutions generally pose a problem to
stability. In order to avoid this problem, the private policy evaluation algorithms that we propose
in Section 3 are based on optimizing slightly modified versions of JX(θ) which promote stability in
their solutions. Note that the notions of stability related to DP are for worst-case situations: that
is, they need to hold for every possible pair of neighbouring input dataset X ' X ′, regardless of
any generative model assumed for the trajectories in those datasets. In particular, these stability
considerations are not directly related to the variance of the estimates in Vˆ pi.
We end this section with a discussion of the main obstruction to stability, i.e. the cases where
argminθ JX(θ) fails to have a unique solution. Given a dataset X with m trajectories we define
a vector FX ∈ RS containing the average first visit returns from all trajectories in X that visit a
particular state. In particular, if Xs represents the multiset of trajectories from X that visit state
s at some point, then we have
FX(s) = FX,s =
1
|Xs|
∑
x∈Xs
Fx,s . (4)
If s is not visited by any trajectory in X we set FX,s = 0. To simplify notation, let FX ∈ RS be
the vector collecting all these estimates. We also define a diagonal matrix ΓX ∈ RS×S with entries
given by the product of the regression weight on each state and the fraction of trajectories in X
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visiting that state: ΓX(s, s) = ρs|Xs|/m. Solving for θ in ∇θJX(θ) = 0, it is easy to see that any
optimal θX ∈ argminθ JX(θ) must satisfy
Φ>ΓXΦθX = Φ>ΓXFX . (5)
Thus, this optimization has a unique solution if and only if the matrix Φ>ΓXΦ is invertible. Since
it is easy to find neighbouring datasets X ' X ′ where at most one of Φ>ΓXΦ and Φ>ΓX′Φ
is invertible, optimizing JX(θ) directly poses a problem to the design differentially private policy
evaluation algorithms with small perturbations. Next we present two DP algorithm based on stable
policy evaluation algorithms.
3 Private First-Visit Monte Carlo Algorithms
In this section we give the details of two differentially private policy evaluation algorithms based
on first-visit Monte Carlo estimates. Each of these algorithms corresponds to a different stable
version of the minimization argminθ JX(θ) described in previous section. A formal privacy analysis
of these algorithms is given in Section 4. Bounds showing how the privacy requirement affects the
utility of the value estimates are presented in Section 5.
3.1 Algorithm DP-LSW
One way to make the optimization argminθ JX(θ) more stable to changes in the dataset X is to
consider a similar least-squares optimization where the optimization weights do not change with X,
and guarantee that the optimization problem is always strongly convex. Thus, we consider a new
objective function given in terms of a new set of positive regression weights ws > 0. Let Γ ∈ RS×S
be a diagonal matrix with Γ(s, s) = ws. We define the objective function as:
JwX(θ) =
∑
s∈S
ws(FX,s − φ>s θ)2 = ‖FX − Φθ‖22,Γ , (6)
where ‖v‖22,Γ = ‖Γ1/2v‖22 = v>Γv is the weighted L2 norm. To see the relation between the
optimizations over JX and J
w
X , note that equating the gradient of J
w
X(θ) to 0 we see that a minimum
θwX ∈ argminθ JwX(θ) must satisfy
Φ>ΓΦθwX = Φ
>ΓFX . (7)
Thus, the optimization problem is well-posed whenever Φ>ΓΦ is invertible, which henceforth will
be our working assumption. Note that this is a mild assumption, since it is satisfied by choosing a
feature matrix Φ with full column rank. Under this assumption we have:
θwX =
(
Φ>ΓΦ
)−1
Φ>ΓFX =
(
Γ1/2Φ
)†
Γ1/2FX , (8)
where M † denotes the Moore–Penrose pseudo-inverse. The difference between optimizing JX(θ)
or JwX(θ) is reflected in the differences between (5) and (7). In particular, if the trajectories in X
are i.i.d. and ps denotes the probability that state s is visited by a trajectory in X, then taking
ws = EX [ρs|Xs|/m] = ρsps yields a loss function JwX(θ) that captures the effect of each state
s in JX(θ) in the asymptotic regime m → ∞. However, we note that knowledge of these visit
probabilities is not required for running our algorithm or for our analysis.
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Our first DP algorithm for policy evaluation applies a carefully calibrated output perturbation
mechanism to the solution θwX of argminθ J
w
X(θ). We call this algorithm DP-LSW, and its full
pseudo-code is given in Algorithm 1. It receives as input the dataset X, the regression weights w,
the feature representation Φ, and the MDP parameters Rmax and γ. Additionally, the algorithm is
parametrized by the privacy parameters ε and δ. Its output is the result of adding a random vector
η drawn from a multivariate Gaussian distribution N (0, σ2XI) to the parameter vector θwX . In order
to compute the variance of η the algorithm needs to solve the discrete optimization problem ψwX =
max0≤k≤KX e
−kβϕwX(k), where KX = maxs∈S |Xs|, β is a parameter computed in the algorithm,
and ϕwX(k) is given by the following expression:
ϕwX(k) =
∑
s∈S
ws
max{|Xs| − k, 1}2 . (9)
Note that ψwX can be computed in time O(KXN).
Algorithm 1: DP-LSW
Input: X, Φ, γ, Rmax, w, ε, δ
Output: θˆwX
Compute θwX ; // cf. (8)
Let α← 5
√
2 ln(2/δ)
ε and β ← ε4(d+ln(2/δ)) ;
Let ψwX ← max0≤k≤KX e−kβϕwX(k) ; // cf. (9)
Let σX ← αRmax‖(Γ
1/2Φ)†‖
1−γ
√
ψwX ;
Sample a d-dimensional vector η ∼ N (0, σ2XI);
Return θˆwX = θ
w
X + η;
The variance of the noise in DP-LSW is proportional to the upper bound Rmax/(1− γ) on the
return from any state. This bound might be excessively pessimistic in some applications, leading
to unnecessary large perturbation of the solution θwX . Fortunately, it is possible to replace the term
Rmax/(1− γ) with any smaller upper bound Fmax on the returns generated by the target MDP on
any state. In practice this leads to more useful algorithms, but it is important to keep in mind that
for the privacy guarantees to remain unaffected, one needs to assume that Fmax is a publicly known
quantity (i.e. it is not based on an estimate made from private data). These same considerations
apply to the algorithm in the next section.
3.2 Algorithm DP-LSL
The second DP algorithm for policy evaluation we propose is also an output perturbation mech-
anism. It differs from DP-LSW in they way stability of the unperturbed solutions is promoted.
In this case, we choose to optimize a regularized version of JX(θ). In particular, we consider the
objective function JλX(θ) obtained by adding a ridge penalty to the least-squares loss from (3):
JλX(θ) = JX(θ) +
λ
2m
‖θ‖22 , (10)
where λ > 0 is a regularization parameter. The introduction of the ridge penalty makes the
objective function JλX(θ) strongly convex, and thus ensures the existence of a unique solution
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θλX = argminθ J
λ
X(θ), which can be obtained in closed-form as:
θλX =
(
Φ>ΓXΦ +
λ
2m
I
)−1
Φ>ΓXFX . (11)
Here ΓX is defined as in Section 2.2.
We call DP-LSL the algorithm obtained by applying an output perturbation mechanism to
the minimizer of JλX(θ); the full pseudo-code is given in Algorithm 2. It receives as input the
privacy parameters ε and δ, a dataset of trajectories X, the regression weights ρ, the feature
representation Φ, a regularization parameter λ > ‖Φ‖2‖ρ‖∞, and the MDP parameters Rmax and
γ. After computing the solution θλX to argminθ J
λ
X(θ), the algorithm outputs θˆ
λ
X = θ
λ
X + η, where
η is a d-dimensional noise vector drawn from N (0, σ2XI). The variance of η is obtained by solving
a discrete optimization problem (different from the one in DP-LSW). Let cλ = ‖Φ‖‖ρ‖∞/
√
2λ and
for k ≥ 0, define ϕλX(k) as: cλ√∑
s
ρs min{|Xs|+ k,m}+ ‖ρ‖2
2 . (12)
Then DP-LSL computes ψλX = max0≤k≤m e
−kβϕλX(k), which can be done in time O(mN).
Algorithm 2: DP-LSL
Input: X, Φ, γ, Rmax, ρ, λ, ε, δ
Output: θˆλX
Compute θλX ; // cf. (11)
Let α← 5
√
2 ln(2/δ)
ε and β ← ε4(d+ln(2/δ)) ;
Let ψλX ← max0≤k≤m e−kβϕλX(k) ; // cf. (12)
Let σX ← 2αRmax‖Φ‖(1−γ)(λ−‖Φ‖2‖ρ‖∞)
√
ψλX ;
Sample a d-dimensional vector η ∼ N (0, σ2XI);
Return θˆλX = θ
λ
X + η;
4 Privacy Analysis
This section provides a formal privacy analysis for DP-LSW and DP-LSL and shows that both
algorithms are (ε, δ)-differentially private. We use the smooth sensitivity framework of [Nissim
et al., 2007, 2011], which provides tools for the design of DP mechanisms with data-dependent
output perturbations. We rely on the following lemma, which provides sufficient conditions for
calibrating Gaussian output perturbation mechanisms with variance proportional to smooth upper
bounds of the local sensitivity.
Lemma 1 (Nissim et al. [2011]). Let A be an algorithm that on input X computes a vector µX ∈ Rd
deterministically and then outputs ZX ∼ N (µX , σ2XI), where σ2X is a variance that depends on
X. Let α = α(ε, δ) = 5
√
2 ln(2/δ)/ε and β = β(ε, δ, d) = ε/(4d + 4 ln(2/δ)). Suppose ε and
δ are such that the following are satisfied for every pair of neighbouring datasets X ' X ′: (a)
σX ≥ α‖µX − µX′‖2, and (b) | ln(σ2X)− ln(σ2X′)| ≤ β. Then A is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
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Condition (a) says we need variance at least proportional to the local sensitivity LS2(f,X).
Condition (b) asks that the variance does not change too fast between neighbouring datasets, by
imposing the constraint σ2X/σ
2
X′ ≤ eβ. This is precisely the spirit of the smoothed sensitivity
principle: calibrate the noise to a smooth upper bound of the local sensitivity. We acknowledge
Lemma 1 is only available in pre-print form, and thus provide an elementary proof in Appendix A
for completeness. The remaining proofs from this section are presented Appendices B and C.
4.1 Privacy Analysis of DP-LSW
We start by providing an upper bound on the norm ‖θwX − θwX′‖2 for any two neighbouring datasets
X ' X ′. Using (8) it is immediate that:
‖θwX − θwX′‖2 ≤ ‖(Γ1/2Φ)†‖‖FX − FX′‖2,Γ . (13)
Thus, we need to bound ‖FX − FX′‖2,Γ.
Lemma 2. Let X ' X ′ be two neighbouring datasets of m trajectories with X = (x1, . . . , xm−1, x)
and X ′ = (x1, . . . , xm−1, x′). Let X◦ = (x1, . . . , xm−1). Let Sx (resp. Sx′) denote the set of states
visited by x (resp. x′). Then we have
‖FX − FX′‖2,Γ ≤ Rmax
1− γ
√ ∑
s∈Sx∪Sx′
ws
(|X◦s |+ 1)2
.
Since the condition in Lemma 1 needs to hold for any dataset X ′ neighbouring X, we take the
supremum of the bound above over all neighbours., which yields the following corollary.
Corollary 3. If X is a dataset of trajectories, then the following holds for every neighbouring
dataset X ′ ' X:
‖FX − FX′‖2,Γ ≤ Rmax
1− γ
√∑
s∈S
ws
max{|Xs|, 1}2 .
Using this result we see that in order to satisfy item (a) of Lemma 1 we can choose a noise
variance satisfying:
σX ≥ αRmax‖(Γ
1/2Φ)†‖
1− γ
√∑
s∈S
ws
max{|Xs|, 1}2 , (14)
where only the last multiplicative term depends on the dataset X, and the rest can be regarded
as a constant that depends on parameters of the problem which are either public or chosen by the
user, and will not change for a neighbouring dataset X ′. Thus, we are left with a lower bound
expressible as σX ≥ C
√
ϕwX , where ϕ
w
X =
∑
s(ws/max{|Xs|, 1}2) only depends on the dataset X
through its signature 〈X〉 ∈ NS given by the number of times each state appears in the trajectories
of X: 〈X〉(s) = |Xs|. Accordingly, we write ϕwX = ϕw(〈X〉), where ϕw : NS → R is the function
ϕw(v) =
∑
s
ws
max{vs, 1}2 . (15)
The signatures of two neighbouring datasets X ' X ′ satisfy ‖〈X〉 − 〈X ′〉‖∞ ≤ 1 because
replacing a single trajectory can only change by one the number of first visits to any particular
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state. Thus, assuming we have a function ψ : NS → R satisfying ψw(v) ≥ ϕw(v) and | ln(ψw(v))−
ln(ψw(v′))| ≤ β for all v, v′ ∈ NS with ‖v−v′‖∞ ≤ 1, we can take σX = C
√
ψw(〈X〉). This variance
clearly satisfies the conditions of Lemma 1 since
| ln(σ2X)− ln(σ2X′)| = | ln(ψw(〈X〉))− ln(ψw(〈X ′〉))| ≤ β .
The function ψw is known as a β-smooth upper bound of ϕw, and the following result provides a
tool for constructing such functions.
Lemma 4 (Nissim et al. [2007]). Let ϕ : NS → R. For any k ≥ 0 let ϕk(v) = max‖v−v′‖∞≤k ϕ(v′).
Given β > 0, the smallest β-smooth upper bound of ϕ is the function
ψ(v) = sup
k≥0
(
e−kβϕk(v)
)
. (16)
For some functions ϕ, the upper bound ψ can be hard to compute or even approximate [Nissim
et al., 2007]. Fortunately, in our case a simple inspection of (15) reveals that ϕwk (v) is easy to
compute. In particular, the following lemma implies that ψw(v) can be obtained in time O(N‖v‖∞).
Lemma 5. The following holds for every v ∈ NS :
ϕwk (v) =
∑
s∈S
ws
max{vs − k, 1}2 .
Furthermore, for every k ≥ ‖v‖∞ − 1 we have ϕwk (v) =
∑
sws.
Combining the last two lemmas, we see that the quantity ψwX computed in DP-LSW is in fact
a β-smooth upper bound to ϕwX . Because the variance σX used in DP-LSW can be obtained by
plugging this upper bound into (14), the two conditions of Lemma 1 are satisfied. This completes
the proof of the main result of this section:
Theorem 6. Algorithm DP-LSW is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
Before proceeding to the next privacy analysis, note that Corollary 3 is the reason why a
mechanism with output perturbations proportional to the global sensitivity is not sufficient in this
case. The bound there says that if in the worst case we can find datasets of an arbitrary size m
where some states are visited few (or zero) times, then the global sensitivity will not vanish as
m→∞. Hence, the utility of such algorithm would not improve with the size of the dataset. The
smoothed sensitivity approach works around this problem by adding large noise to these datasets,
but adding much less noise to datasets where each state appears a sufficient number of times.
Corollary 3 also provides the basis for efficiently computing smooth upper bounds to the local
sensitivity. In principle, condition (b) in Lemma 1 refers to any dataset neighbouring X, of which
there are uncountably many because we consider real rewards. Bounding the local sensitivity in
terms of the signature reduces this to finitely many “classes” of neighbours, and the form of the
bound in Corollary 3 makes it possible to apply Lemma 4 efficiently.
4.2 Privacy Analysis of DP-LSL
The proof that DP-LSL is differentially private follows the same strategy as for DP-LSW. We start
with a lemma that bounds the local sensitivity of θλX for pairs of neighbouring datasets X ' X ′.
We use the notation Is∈x for an indicator variable that is equal to one when state s is visited within
trajectory x.
9
Lemma 7. Let X ' X ′ be two neighbouring datasets of m trajectories with X = (x1, . . . , xm−1, x)
and X ′ = (x1, . . . , xm−1, x′). Let Fx ∈ RS (resp. Fx′ ∈ RS) be the vector given by Fx(s) = Fx,s
(resp. Fx′(s) = Fx′,s). Define diagonal matrices Γρ,∆x,x′ ∈ RS×S given by Γρ(s, s) = ρs and
∆x,x′(s, s) = Is∈x − Is∈x′. If the regularization parameter satisfies λ > ‖Φ>∆x,x′ΓρΦ‖, then:
‖θλX − θλX′‖2
2
≤
∥∥∥(∆x,x′ΦθλX − Fx + Fx′)> ΓρΦ∥∥∥
2
λ− ‖Φ>∆x,x′ΓρΦ‖ .
As before, we need to consider the supremum of the bound over all possible neighbours X ′ of
X. In particular, we would like to get a bound whose only dependence on the dataset X is through
the signature 〈X〉. This is the purpose of the following corollary:
Corollary 8. Let X be a dataset of trajectories and suppose λ > ‖Φ‖2‖ρ‖∞. Then the following
holds for every neighbouring dataset X ′ ' X:
‖θλX − θλX′‖2 ≤
2Rmax‖Φ‖
(1− γ)(λ− ‖Φ‖2‖ρ‖∞)
√
ϕλX ,
where
ϕλX =
‖Φ‖‖ρ‖∞√
2λ
√∑
s∈S
ρs|Xs|+ ‖ρ‖2
2 .
By the same reasoning of Section 4.1, as long as the regularization parameter is larger than
‖Φ‖2‖ρ‖∞, a differentially private algorithm can be obtained by adding to θλX a Gaussian pertur-
bation with a variance satisfying
σX ≥ 2αRmax‖Φ‖
(1− γ)(λ− ‖Φ‖2‖ρ‖∞)
√
ϕλX
and the second condition of Lemma 1. This second requirement can be achieved by computing a
β-smooth upper bound of the function ϕλ : NS → R given by
ϕλ(v) =
‖Φ‖‖ρ‖∞√
2λ
√∑
s∈S
ρs max{vs,m}+ ‖ρ‖2
2 .
When going from ϕλX to ϕ
λ(v) we substituted |Xs| by max{vs,m} to reflect the fact that any state
cannot be visited by more than m trajectories in a dataset X of size m. It turns out that in this
case the function ϕλk(v) = max‖v−v′‖∞≤k ϕ
λ(v′) arising in Lemma 4 is also easy to compute.
Lemma 9. For every v ∈ NS , ϕλk(v) is equal to:‖Φ‖‖ρ‖∞√
2λ
√∑
s∈S
ρs max{vs + k,m}+ ‖ρ‖2
2 .
Furthermore, for every k ≥ m−mins vs we have ϕλk(v) =
(‖Φ‖‖ρ‖∞√m√
2λ
√∑
s∈S ρs + ‖ρ‖2
)2
.
Finally, in view of Lemma 4, Corollary 8, and Lemma 9, the variance of the noise perturbation
in DP-LSL satisfies the conditions of Lemma 1, so we have proved the following.
Theorem 10. Algorithm DP-LSL is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
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5 Utility Analysis
Because the promise of differential privacy has to hold for any possible pair of neighbouring datasets
X ' X ′, the analysis in previous section does not assume any generative model for the input dataset
X. However, in practical applications we expect X = (x1, . . . , xm) to contain multiple trajectories
sampled from the same policy on the same MDP. The purpose of this section is to show that when
the trajectories xi are i.i.d. the utility of our differentially private algorithms increases asm→∞. In
other words, when the input dataset grows, the amount of noise added by our algorithms decreases,
thus leading to more accurate estimates of the value function. This matches the intuition that when
outputting a fixed number of parameters, using data from more users to estimate these parameters
leads to a smaller individual contributions from each user, and makes the privacy constraint easier
to satisfy.
To measure the utility of our DP algorithms we shall bound the difference in empirical risk
between the private and non-private parameters learned from a given dataset. That is, we want
to show that the quantity EX,η[J•X(θˆ•X) − J•X(θ•X)] vanishes as |X| = m → ∞, for both • = w
and • = λ. The first theorem bounds the expected empirical excess risk of DP-LSW. The bound
contains two terms: one vanishes as m → ∞, and the other reflects the fact that states which are
never visited pose a problem to stability. The proof is deferred to Appendix D.
Theorem 11. Let S0 = {s ∈ S|ps = 0} and S+ = S \S0. Let C = αRmax‖(Γ1/2Φ)†‖‖Γ1/2Φ‖F /(1−
γ). Suppose β ≤ 1/2. Then EX,η[JwX(θˆwX)− JwX(θwX)] is upper bounded by:
C2
∑
s∈S0
ws + 6
∑
s∈S+
ws
(
1
p2sm
2
+ β2
(
1− βps
2
)m) .
Note the above bound depends on the dimension d through β and ‖Γ1/2Φ‖F . In terms of the
size of the dataset, we can get excess risk bounds that decreases quadratically with m by assuming
that either all states are visited with non-zero probability or the user sets the regression weights so
that such states do not contribute to θwX .
Corollary 12. If ws = 0 for all s ∈ S0, then EX,η[JwX(θˆwX)− JwX(θwX)] = O(1/m2).
A similar theorem can be proved for DP-LSL. However, in this case the statement of the bound
is complicated by the appearance of co-occurrence probabilities of the form Px[s ∈ x ∧ s′ ∈ x]
and Px[s ∈ x ∧ s′ /∈ x]. Here we only state the main corollary of our result; the full statement
and the corresponding proofs are presented in Appendix E. This corollary is obtained by assuming
the regularization parameter is allowed to grow with m, and stresses the tensions in selecting an
adequate regularization schedule.
Corollary 13. Suppose λ = ω(1) with respect to m. Then we have EX,η[JλX(θˆλX) − JλX(θλX)] =
O(1/λm+ 1/λ2 +m/λ3).
Note that taking λ = Θ(m) we get a bound on the excess risk of order O(1/m2). However, if
we want the regularization term in JλX(θ) to vanish as m → ∞ we need λ = o(m). We shall see
importance of this trade-off in our experiments.
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Figure 1: Empirical comparison of differentially private and non-private algorithms
6 Experiments
In this section we illustrate the behaviour of the proposed algorithms on synthetic examples. The
domain we use consists of a chain of N states, where in each state the agent has some probability
p of staying and probability (1 − p) of advancing to its right. There is a reward of 1 when the
agent reaches the final, absorbing state, and 0 for all other states. While this is a toy example,
it illustrates the typical case of policy evaluation in the medical domain, where patients tend to
progress through stages of recovery at different speeds, and past states are not typically revisited
(partly because in the medical domain, states contain historic information about past treatments).
Trajectories are drawn by starting in an initial state distribution and generating state-action-reward
transitions according to the described probabilities until the absorbing state is reached. Trajectories
are harvested in a batch, and the same batches are processed by all algorithms.
We experiment with both a tabular representation of the value function, as well as with function
approximation. In the latter case, we simply aggregate pairs of adjacent states, which are hence
forced to take the same value. We compared the proposed private algorithms DP-LSW and DP-
LSL with their non-private equivalents LSW and LSL. The performance measure used is average
root mean squared error over the state space. The error is obtained by comparing the state values
estimated by the learning algorithms against the exact values obtained by exact, tabular dynamic
programming. Standard errors computed over 20 independent runs are included.
The main results are summarized in Fig. 1, for an environment with N = 40 states, p = 0.5,
discount γ = 0.99, and for the DP algorithms, ε = 0.1 and δ = 0.1. In general, these constants
should be chosen depending on the privacy constraints of the domain. Our theoretical results
explain the expected effect of these choices on the privacy-utility trade-off so we do not provide
extensive experiments with different values.
The left plot in Fig. 1 compares the non-private LSL and LSW versions of Monte Carlo evalu-
ation, in the tabular and function approximation case. As can be seen, both algorithms are very
stable and converge to the same solution, but LSW converges faster. The second plot compares the
performance of all algorithms in the tabular case, over a range of regularization parameters, for two
different batch sizes. The third plot compares the expected RMSE of the algorithms when run with
state aggregation, as a function of batch size. As can be seen, the DP algorithms converge to the
same solutions as the non-private corresponding versions for large enough batch sizes. Interestingly,
the two proposed approaches serve different needs. The LSL algorithms work better with small
batches of data, whereas the LSW approach is preferable with large batches. From an empirical
point of view, the trade-off between accuracy and privacy in the DP-LSL algorithm should be done
by setting a regularization schedule proportional to
√
m. While the theory suggests it is not the
12
best schedule in terms of excess empirical risk, it achieves the best overall accuracy.
Finally, the last figure shows excess empirical risk as a function of the batch size. Interestingly,
more aggressive function approximation helps both differentially private algorithms converge faster.
This is intuitive, since using the same data to estimate fewer parameters means the effect of each
individual trajectory is already obscured by the function approximation. Decreasing the number
of parameters of the function approximator, d, increases β, which lowers the smooth sensitivity
bounds. In medical applications, one expects to have many attributes measured about patients,
and to need aggressive function approximation in order to provide generalization. This result tells
us that differentially private algorithms should be favoured in this case as well.
Overall, the empirical results are very promising, showing that especially as batch size increases,
the noise introduced by the DP mechanism decreases rapidly, and these algorithms provide the same
performance but with the additional privacy guarantees.
7 Conclusion
We present the first differentially private algorithms for policy evaluation in the full MDP setting.
Our algorithms are built on top of established Monte Carlo methods, and come with utility guar-
antees showing that the cost of privacy diminishes as training batches get larger. The smoothed
sensitivity framework is a key component of our analyses, which differ from previous works on
DP mechanisms for ERM and bandits problems in two substantial ways. The first, we consider
optimizations with non-Lipschitz loss functions, which prevents us from using most of the estab-
lished techniques for analyzing privacy and utility in ERM algorithms and complicates some parts
of our analysis. In particular, we cannot leverage the tight utility analysis of [Jain and Thakurta,
2014] to get dimension independent bounds. Second, and more importantly, the natural model
of neighbouring datasets for policy evaluation involves replacing a whole trajectory. This implies
that neighbouring datasets can differ in multiple regression targets, which is quite different from the
usual supervised learning approach where neighbouring datasets can only change a single regression
target. Our approach is also different from the on-line learning and bandits setting, where there is
a single stream of experience and neighbouring datasets differ in one element of the stream. Note
that this setting cannot be used naturally in the full MDP setup, because successive observations
in a single stream are inherently correlated.
In future work we plan to extend our techniques in two directions. First, we would like to design
DP policy evaluation methods based on temporal-difference learning [Sutton, 1988]. Secondly, we
will tackle the control case, where policy evaluation is often used as a sub-routine, e.g. as in actor-
critic methods. We also plan to evaluate the current algorithms on patient data from an ongoing
clinical study (in which case, errors cannot be estimated precisely, because the right answer is not
known).
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A Smoothed Gaussian Perturbation
A proof of Lemma 1 in the paper can be found in the pre-print Nissim et al. [2011]. For the sake
of completeness, we provide here an elementary proof (albeit with slightly worse constants). In
particular, we are going to prove the following.
Lemma 14. Let A be an algorithm that on input X computes a vector µX ∈ Rd deterministically
and then outputs ZX ∼ N (µX , σ2XI), where σ2X is a variance that depends on X. Let α = α(ε, δ) =
15
√
2 ln(4/δ)/ε and β = β(ε, δ, d) = (2 ln 2)ε/5(
√
d +
√
2 ln(4/δ))2. Suppose that ε ≤ 5, δ and d
are such β ≤ ln 2, and the following are satisfied for every pair of neighbouring datasets X ' X ′:
1. σX ≥ α‖µX − µX′‖2,
2. | ln(σ2X)− ln(σ2X′)| ≤ β.
Then A is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
We start with a simple characterization of (ε, δ)-differential privacy that will be useful for our
proof.
Lemma 15. Let A(X) = θX ∈ Rd be the output of a randomized algorithm on input X. Write
fθX (θ) for the probability density of the output of A on input X. Suppose that for every pair of
neighbouring datasets X ' X ′ there exists a measurable set ΘX,X′ ⊂ Rd such that the following are
satisfied:
1. P[θX /∈ ΘX,X′ ] ≤ δ;
2. for all θ ∈ ΘX,X′ we have fθX (θ) ≤ eεfθX′ (θ).
Then A is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
Proof. Fix a pair of neighbouring datasets X ' X ′ and let E ⊆ Rd be any measurable set. Let
ΘX,X′ be as in the statement and write Θ
c
X,X′ = R
d \ΘX,X′ . Using the assumptions on ΘX,X′ we
see that
P[θX ∈ E] = P[θX ∈ E ∩ΘX,X′ ] + P[θX ∈ E ∩ΘcX,X′ ]
≤ eεP[θX′ ∈ E ∩ΘX,X′ ] + δ
≤ eεP[θX′ ∈ E] + δ .
Now we proceed with the proof of Lemma 14. Let X ' X ′ be two neighbouring datasets and
let us write Z1 = ZX and Z2 = ZX′ for simplicity. Thus, for i = 1, 2 we have that Zi ∼ N (µi, σ2i I)
are d-dimensional independent Gaussian random variables whose means and variances satisfy the
assumptions of Lemma 14 for some ε, δ > 0. The density function of Zi is denoted by fZi(z). In
order to be able to apply Lemma 15 we want to show that the privacy loss between Z1 and Z2
defined as
L(z) = ln
fZ1(z)
fZ2(z)
(17)
is bounded by ε for all z ∈ Ω, where Ω ⊂ Rd is an event with probability at least 1− δ under Z1.
We can start by identifying a candidate Ω. Since Ω has to have high probability w.r.t. Z1, it
should contain µ1 because a ball around the mean is the event with the highest probability under
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a spherical Gaussian distribution (among those with the same Lebesgue measure). For technical
reasons, instead of a ball we will take a slightly more complicated region, which for now we will
parametrize by two quantities a, b > 0. The definition of this region will depend on the difference
of means ∆ = µ2 − µ1:
Ω = Ωa ∩ Ωb = {z + µ1 ∈ Rd | | 〈z,∆〉 | ≤ a} ∩ {z + µ1 ∈ Rd | ‖z‖ ≤ b} . (18)
We need to choose a and b such that the probability P[Z1 /∈ Ω] ≤ δ, and for that we shall combine
two different tail bounds. On the one hand, note that Z = 〈Z1 − µ1,∆〉 /(σ1‖∆‖) ∼ N (0, 1) is a
one dimensional standard Gaussian random variable and recall that for any t ≥ 0:
P[|Z| > t] ≤ 2e−t2/2 . (19)
On the other hand, X = ‖Z1 − µ1‖2/σ21 ∼ χ2d follows a chi-squared distribution with d degrees of
freedom, for which is known Laurent and Massart [2000] that for all t ≥ 0:
P[X > d+ 2
√
dt+ 2t] ≤ e−t . (20)
To make our choices for a and b we can take them such that P[Z1 /∈ Ωa],P[Z1 /∈ Ωb] ≤ δ/2, since
then by a union bound we will get
P[Z1 /∈ Ω] ≤ P[Z1 /∈ ΩA] + P[Z1 /∈ ΩB] ≤ δ . (21)
Since Z satisfies |Z| ≤√2 ln(4/δ) with probability at least 1− δ/2, we can take
a = σ1‖∆‖
√
2 ln
4
δ
= σ1‖∆‖Cδ . (22)
For X we have that d+2
√
d ln(2/δ)+2 ln(2/δ) ≤ d+2√2d ln(2/δ)+2 ln(2/δ) = (√d+√2 ln(2/δ))2.
Hence, we choose
b = σ1(
√
d+
√
2 ln(2/δ)) = σ1Dδ . (23)
Fixing this choice of Ω, we now proceed to see under what conditions on σ1 and σ2 we can get
L(z) ≤ ε for all z ∈ Ω. We start by expanding the definition of L(z) to get
L(z) =
d
2
ln
σ22
σ21
+
‖µ2 − z‖2
2σ22
− ‖µ1 − z‖
2
2σ21
. (24)
The easiest thing to do is to separate this quantity into several parts and insist on each part being
at most a fraction of ε. To simplify calculations we will just require that each part is at most
 = ε/5. This reasoning applied to the first term shows that we must satisfy
σ22
σ21
≤ e2/d . (25)
Note that this becomes more restrictive as  ≈ 0 or d→∞, in which case we have e/d ≈ 1.
Next we look at the second part and write z = z′ + µ1 because this is the form of the vectors
in Ω. With some algebra we get:
‖µ2 − (z′ + µ1)‖2
2σ22
− ‖µ1 − (z
′ + µ1)‖2
2σ21
=
‖∆‖2 + ‖z′‖2 − 2 〈z′,∆〉
2σ22
− ‖z
′‖2
2σ21
. (26)
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To further decompose this quantity we write z′ ∈ Rd as z′ = zp + zo, where zp = ∆ 〈z′,∆〉 /‖∆‖2 is
the orthogonal projection of z onto the line spanned by the vector ∆, and zo is the corresponding
orthogonal complement. Pythagora’s Theorem implies ‖z′‖2 = ‖zp‖2 + ‖zo‖2, and the RHS in the
above expression is equal to
‖∆‖2
2σ22
− 〈z
′,∆〉
σ22
+
| 〈z′,∆〉 |2
2‖∆‖2
(
1
σ22
− 1
σ21
)
+
‖zo‖2
2
(
1
σ22
− 1
σ21
)
. (27)
Now note that the last two terms can be upper bounded by zero if σ1 ≤ σ2, but need to be taken
into account otherwise. Furthermore, if it were the case that σ1  σ2 ≈ 0, then these terms could
grow unboundedly. Thus we shall require that a bound of the form
σ21
σ22
≤ γ , (28)
holds for some γ ≥ 1 to be specified later. Nonetheless, we observe that under this assumption
1
σ22
− 1
σ21
≤ γ − 1
σ21
. (29)
Furthermore, z ∈ Ω implies ‖zo‖2 ≤ ‖z′‖2 = ‖z − µ1‖ ≤ b2 and | 〈z′,∆〉 |2 = | 〈z − µ1,∆〉 |2 ≤ a2.
Thus we see that
| 〈z′,∆〉 |2
2‖∆‖2
(
1
σ22
− 1
σ21
)
≤ C
2
δ (γ − 1)
2
, (30)
and
‖zo‖2
2
(
1
σ22
− 1
σ21
)
≤ D
2
δ (γ − 1)
2
. (31)
By requiring that each of these bounds is at most  we obtain the following constraint for γ:
γ ≤ 1 + 2
max{C2δ , D2δ}
, (32)
which can be satisfied by taking, for example:
γ = 1 +
2(√
d+
√
2 ln(4/δ)
)2 . (33)
Note that for fixed δ, small  and/or large d this choice of γ will make (28) behave much like the
bound (25) we assumed above for σ22/σ
2
1. In fact, using that 1 + x ≥ ex ln 2 for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 we see
that (28) can be satisfied if 2/(
√
d+
√
2 ln(4/δ))2 ≤ 1 and
σ21
σ22
≤ exp
 (2 ln 2)(√
d+
√
2 ln(4/δ)
)2
 . (34)
From here it is immediate to see that if the second condition | ln(σ21)− ln(σ22)| ≤ β in Lemma 14 is
satisfied, then (25) and (34) are both satisfied.
17
The missing ingredient to show that L(z) ≤ ε for all z ∈ Ω is an absolute lower bound on σ1.
This will follow from bounding the remaining terms in L(z) as follows:
‖∆‖2
2σ22
− 〈z
′,∆〉
σ22
≤ ‖∆‖
2 + 2σ1‖∆‖Cδ
2σ22
(35)
≤ γ
2
‖∆‖2 + 2σ1‖∆‖Cδ
σ21
(36)
≤ 3
2
‖∆‖2 + 2σ1‖∆‖Cδ
σ21
(37)
=
3‖∆‖2
2σ21
+
3‖∆‖Cδ
σ1
, (38)
where we used that  ≤ 1 implies γ ≤ 3. If we require each of these two terms to be at most , we
obtain the constraint:
σ1 ≥ ‖∆‖max
{√
3
2
,
3Cδ

}
=
3‖∆‖Cδ

. (39)
To conclude the proof just note that the above bound can be rewritten as σ1 ≥ α‖∆‖, which is
precisely the first condition in Lemma 14.
B Privacy Analysis of DP-LSW
Lemma 16. Let X ' X ′ be two neighbouring datasets of m trajectories with X = (x1, . . . , xm−1, x)
and X ′ = (x1, . . . , xm−1, x′). Let X◦ = (x1, . . . , xm−1). Let Sx (resp. Sx′) denote the set of states
visited by x (resp. x′). Then we have
‖FX − FX′‖2,Γ ≤ Rmax
1− γ
√ ∑
s∈Sx∪Sx′
ws
(|X◦s |+ 1)2
.
Proof. We start by noting that if s ∈ S \ (Sx ∪ Sx′), then FX,s = FX′,s. In the case s ∈ Sx ∪ Sx′
we can write FX,s = (|X◦s |FX◦,s + Fx,s)/(|X◦s |+ 1). Using a symmetric expression for FX′,s we see
that in this case
|FX,s − FX′,s| = 1|X◦s |+ 1
|Fx,s − Fx′,s| ≤ 1|X◦s |+ 1
max{Fx,s, Fx′,s} ≤ 1|X◦s |+ 1
Rmax
1− γ ,
where we used that 0 ≤ Fx,s ≤ Rmax/(1 − γ) for all s and x. When s ∈ Sx \ Sx′ we can use the
same expression as before for FX,s and write FX′,s = FX◦,s. A similar argument as in the previous
case then yields
|FX,s − FX′,s| = 1|X◦s |+ 1
|Fx,s − FX◦,s| ≤ 1|X◦s |+ 1
Rmax
1− γ .
Note the same bound also holds for the case s ∈ Sx′ \Sx. Finally, since we have seen that the same
bound holds for all s ∈ Sx ∪ Sx′ , we obtain∑
s∈S
ws(FX,s − FX′,s)2 ≤ R
2
max
(1− γ)2
∑
s∈Sx∪Sx′
ws
(|X◦s |+ 1)2
,
which yields the desired bound.
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Corollary 17. If X is a dataset of trajectories, then the following holds for every neighbouring
dataset X ′ ' X:
‖FX − FX′‖2,Γ ≤ Rmax
1− γ
√∑
s∈S
ws
max{|Xs|, 1}2 .
Proof. Using the notation from Lemma 16 we observe that |Xs| = |X◦s |+1 if s ∈ Sx, and |Xs| = |X◦s |
if s /∈ Sx. Therefore, the following holds for any trajectories x, x′:∑
s∈Sx∪Sx′
ws
(|X◦s |+ 1)2
≤
∑
s∈S
ws
(|X◦s |+ 1)2
=
∑
s∈Sx
ws
|Xs|2 +
∑
s∈S\Sx
ws
(|Xs|+ 1)2 ≤
∑
s∈SX
ws
|Xs|2 +
∑
s∈S\SX
ws ,
where SX denotes the set of states visited by at least one trajectory from X. Since s /∈ SX implies
|Xs| = 0, we can plug this bound into the result of Lemma 16 as follows:
‖FX − FX′‖2,Γ ≤ Rmax
1− γ
√∑
s∈SX
ws
|Xs|2 +
∑
s∈S\SX
ws =
Rmax
1− γ
√∑
s∈S
ws
max{|Xs|, 1}2 .
Lemma 18. The following holds for every v ∈ NS :
ϕwk (v) =
∑
s∈S
ws
max{vs − k, 1}2 .
Furthermore, for every k ≥ ‖v‖∞ − 1 we have ϕwk (v) =
∑
sws.
Proof. Recall that ϕwk (v) = max‖v′−v‖∞≤k ϕ
w(v′) with ϕw(v) =
∑
sws/max{vs, 1}2 and observe
the result follows immediately because
ϕwk (v) =
∑
s∈S
ws
min−k≤l≤k max{vs + l, 1}2 =
∑
s∈S
ws
max{vs − k, 1}2 .
C Privacy Analysis of DP-LSL
Lemma 19. Let X ' X ′ be two neighbouring datasets of m trajectories with X = (x1, . . . , xm−1, x)
and X ′ = (x1, . . . , xm−1, x′). Let Fx ∈ RS (resp. Fx′ ∈ RS) be the vector given by Fx(s) = Fx,s
(resp. Fx′(s) = Fx′,s). Define the diagonal matrices Γρ,∆x,x′ ∈ RS×S given by Γρ(s, s) = ρs and
∆x,x′(s, s) = Is∈x − Is∈x′. If the regularization parameter satisfies λ > ‖Φ>∆x,x′ΓρΦ‖, then the
following holds:
‖θλX − θλX′‖2
2
≤
∥∥∥(∆x,x′ΦθλX − Fx + Fx′)> ΓρΦ∥∥∥
2
λ− ‖Φ>∆x,x′ΓρΦ‖ . (40)
Proof. In order to simplify our notation we write θ¯ = θλX and θ¯
′ = θλX′ for the rest of the proof.
Given a trajectory x and a vector θ ∈ Rd we shall also write `(x, θ) = ∑s∈Sx ρs(Fx,s − φ>s θ)2 so
that JX(θ) =
1
m
∑m
i=1 `(xi, θ). Now we proceed with the proof.
Let us start by noting that because JλX(θ) is λ/m-strongly convex, we have J
λ
X(θ1)− JλX(θ2) ≥
〈∇JλX(θ2), θ1−θ2〉+ λ2m‖θ1−θ2‖22 for any θ1, θ2 ∈ Rd. Thus, using that optimality implies ∇JλX(θ¯) =
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∇JλX′(θ¯′) = 0, we get
λ
m
‖θ¯ − θ¯′‖22 ≤ JλX(θ¯′)− JλX(θ¯) + JλX′(θ¯)− JλX′(θ¯′)
= JX(θ¯
′)− JX(θ¯) + JX′(θ¯)− JX′(θ¯′)
=
1
m
(
`(x, θ¯′)− `(x, θ¯) + `(x′, θ¯)− `(x′, θ¯′)) ,
where the equalities follows from definitions of X, X ′, JλX and JX . If we now expand the definition
of `(x, θ) we see that
`(x, θ¯′)− `(x, θ¯) =
∑
s∈Sx
ρs
(
(φ>s θ¯
′)2 − (φ>s θ¯)2 − 2Fx,sφ>s (θ¯′ − θ¯)
)
,
`(x′, θ¯)− `(x′, θ¯′) =
∑
s∈Sx′
ρs
(
(φ>s θ¯)
2 − (φ>s θ¯′)2 − 2Fx′,sφ>s (θ¯ − θ¯′)
)
.
Using the identity (φ>s θ¯′)2− (φ>s θ¯)2 = (θ¯′+ θ¯)>φsφ>s (θ¯′− θ¯), we rewrite `(x, θ¯′)− `(x, θ¯) + `(x′, θ¯)−
`(x′, θ¯′) as ∑
s∈S
ρs
[
(Is∈x − Is∈x′)(θ¯′ + θ¯)>φsφ>s − 2(Fx,s − Fx′,s)φ>s
]
(θ¯′ − θ¯) , (41)
where we implicitly used that Fx,s = 0 whenever s /∈ x. Finally, using the definitions in the
statement we can rearrange the above expression to show that
λ
m
‖θ¯ − θ¯′‖22 ≤
1
m
(
(θ¯′ + θ¯)>Φ>∆x,x′ − 2(Fx − Fx′)>
)
ΓρΦ(θ¯
′ − θ¯)
=
2
m
(
θ¯>Φ>∆x,x′ − (Fx − Fx′)>
)
ΓρΦ(θ¯
′ − θ¯) + 1
m
(θ¯′ − θ¯)>Φ>∆x,x′ΓρΦ(θ¯′ − θ¯)
≤ 2
m
‖
(
θ¯>Φ>∆x,x′ − (Fx − Fx′)>
)
ΓρΦ‖2‖θ¯′ − θ¯‖2 + 1
m
‖Φ>∆x,x′ΓρΦ‖‖θ¯′ − θ¯‖22 ,
where we used the Cauchy–Schwartz inequality and the definition of operator norm. The result
now follows by solving for ‖θ¯ − θ¯′‖2 in the above inequality.
Corollary 20. Let X be a dataset of trajectories and suppose λ > ‖Φ‖2‖ρ‖∞. Then the following
holds for any neighbouring dataset X ′ ' X:
‖θλX − θλX′‖2 ≤
2Rmax‖Φ‖
(1− γ)(λ− ‖Φ‖2‖ρ‖∞)
√
ϕλX ,
where
ϕλX =
‖Φ‖‖ρ‖∞√
2λ
√∑
s∈S
ρs|Xs|+ ‖ρ‖2
2 .
Proof. We start by noting that ‖∆x,x′‖ ≤ 1 and ‖Γρ‖ = ‖ρ‖∞, hence submultiplicativity of matrix
operator norms yields ‖Φ>∆x,x′ΓρΦ‖ ≤ ‖Φ‖2‖ρ‖∞. On the other hand, for the numerator in (40)
we have ∥∥∥∥(∆x,x′ΦθλX − Fx + Fx′)> ΓρΦ∥∥∥∥
2
≤
(
‖θλX‖2‖Φ‖‖ρ‖∞ + ‖(Fx − Fx′)>Γρ‖2
)
‖Φ‖ . (42)
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Bounding the individual entries in Fx and Fx′ by Rmax/(1 − γ) we get ‖(Fx − Fx′)>Γρ‖2 ≤
Rmax‖ρ‖2/(1 − γ). The last step is to bound the norm ‖θλX‖2, for which we use the closed-form
solution to argminθ J
λ
X(θ) given in the paper and write:
‖θλX‖2 ≤
∥∥∥∥(Φ>ΓXΦ + λ2mI)−1Φ>Γ1/2X
∥∥∥∥ ‖FX‖2,ΓX ≤ ∥∥∥∥(Φ>ΓXΦ + λ2mI)−1Φ>Γ1/2X
∥∥∥∥
(
Rmax
1− γ
√∑
s∈S
ρs|Xs|
m
)
.
To bound the last remaining norm let use write UΣV > for the SVD of Γ1/2X Φ, where V ∈ Rd×d
with V >V = V V > = I. With this we can write:
(Φ>ΓXΦ +
λ
2m
I)−1Φ>Γ1/2X = V
(
Σ2 +
λ
2m
I
)−1
ΣU> . (43)
Now we use that ‖U‖ = ‖V ‖ = 1 and x/(x2 + a) ≤ 1/(2√a) for any x ≥ 0 to get ‖V (Σ2 +
(λ/2m)I)−1ΣU>‖ ≤ √m/2λ. Thus we get a bound for ‖θλX‖2 that when plugged into (42) yields
the desired result.
Lemma 21. The following holds for every v ∈ NS :
ϕλk(v) =
‖Φ‖‖ρ‖∞√
2λ
√∑
s∈S
ρs max{vs + k,m}+ ‖ρ‖2
2 .
Furthermore, for every k ≥ m−mins vs we have ϕλk(v) =
(‖Φ‖‖ρ‖∞√m√
2λ
√∑
s∈S ρs + ‖ρ‖2
)2
.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 18 and is omitted.
D Utility Analysis of DP-LSW
The goal of this section is to show that as the size m of the dataset X grows, the differentially
private solution θwX provided by algorithm DP-LSW is not much worse than the one obtained by
directly minimizing JwX(θ). In other words, for large datasets the noise introduced by the privacy
constraint is negligible. We do so by proving a O(1/m2) bound for the expected empirical excess
risk given by EX,η[JwX(θˆwX)− JwX(θwX)]. Our analysis starts with a lemma that leverages the law of
total expectation in order to reduce the bound to a quantity that only depends on EX [σ2X ].
Lemma 22.
EX,η[JwX(θˆwX)− JwX(θwX)] = ‖Γ1/2Φ‖2FEX [σ2X ] . (44)
Proof. By the law of total expectation it is enough to show that
Eη[JwX(θˆwX)− JwX(θwX)|X] = σ2X‖Γ1/2Φ‖2F . (45)
Let X be an arbitrary dataset. Expanding the definition of JwX(θ) we have that for any θ ∈ Rd
JwX(θ) = F
>
XΓFX + θ
>Φ>ΓΦθ − 2F>XΓΦθ . (46)
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On the other hand, since ∇θJwX(θwX) = 0, we have θwX>Φ>ΓΦ = F>XΓΦ. Thus, using the definition
θˆwX = θ
w
X + η, a simple algebraic calculation yields
JwX(θˆ
w
X)− JwX(θwX) = η>Φ>ΓΦη − F>XΓΦη − η>Φ>ΓΦθwX . (47)
Finally, taking the expectation over η ∼ N (0, σ2XI) of the above expression we get
Eη[JwX(θˆwX)− JwX(θwX)] = Eη[η>Φ>ΓΦη] = σ2X Tr(Φ>ΓΦ) = σ2X‖Γ1/2Φ‖2F . (48)
In order to bound EX [σ2X ] we recall the variance has the form σ2X = C2ψwX , where C is a
constant independent of X and
ψwX = max
k≥0
e−kβ
∑
s∈S
ws
max{|Xs| − k, 1}2 ≤
∑
s
ws
(
max
k≥0
e−kβ
max{|Xs| − k, 1}2
)
. (49)
Thus, we can bound EX [σ2X ] = C2EX [ψwX ] by providing a bound for the expectation of each
individual maximum in (49). The two following technical lemmas will prove useful.
Lemma 23. Let b > 0 and a ≥ 1. Then the following holds:
max
0≤x≤a−1
e−bx
(a− x)2 =

1
a2
b < 2/a
e1−ab b > 2
e2
4 b
2e−ab otherwise
(50)
Proof. The result follows from a simple calculation.
Lemma 24. Suppose Bm,p is a binomial random variable with m trials and success probability p.
Then the following hold:
E
[
1
Bm,p + 1
]
=
1− (1− p)m+1
p(m+ 1)
,
E
[
1
B2m,p
IBm,p≥1
]
≤ 6
p(m+ 1)
(
1− (1− p)m+2
p(m+ 2)
− (1− p)m+1 − p(m+ 1)
2
(1− p)m
)
.
Proof. The first expectation is a classical exercise in probability textbooks. The second one can be
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proved as follows:
E
[
1
B2m,p
IBm,p≥1
]
=
m∑
k=1
1
k2
(
m
k
)
pk(1− p)m−k
≤ 6
m∑
k=1
1
(k + 1)(k + 2)
(
m
k
)
pk(1− p)m−k
=
6
p(m+ 1)
m∑
k=1
1
k + 2
(m+ 1)!
(k + 1)!(m− k)!p
k+1(1− p)m−k
=
6
p(m+ 1)
m∑
k=1
1
k + 2
P[Bm+1,p = k + 1]
=
6
p(m+ 1)
m+1∑
j=2
1
j + 1
P[Bm+1,p = j]
=
6
p(m+ 1)
(
E
[
1
Bm+1,p + 1
]
− P[Bm+1,p = 0]− 1
2
P[Bm+1,p = 1]
)
=
6
p(m+ 1)
(
1− (1− p)m+2
p(m+ 2)
− (1− p)m+1 − p(m+ 1)
2
(1− p)m
)
,
where we used the first equation in the last step, and the bound (k+ 1)(k+ 2)/k2 ≤ 6 for k ≥ 1 in
the first inequality.
Recall that ps denotes the probability that a trajectory from X visits states s. Because these
trajectories are i.i.d. we have that |Xs| = Bm,ps is a binomial random variable. Therefore, we can
combine the last two lemmas to prove the following.
Lemma 25. Suppose β ≤ 2. Then we have:
EX
[
max
k≥0
e−kβ
max{|Xs| − k, 1}2
]
≤
{
6
p2s(m+1)(m+2)
+ e
2β2
4 (1− (1− e−β)ps)m ps > 0 ,
1 ps = 0 .
(51)
Proof. Note in the first place that Lemma 23 implies
max
k≥0
e−kβ
max{|Xs| − k, 1}2 = I|Xs|=0 + I1≤|Xs|<2/β
1
|Xs|2 + I|Xs|≥2/β
e2
4
β2e−β|Xs| , (52)
where we used that in the case |Xs| = 0 the maximum is 1. If ps = 0, then obviously |Xs| = 0 almost
surely and the expectation of (52) equals 1. On the other hand, when ps > 0 we use the linearity
of expectation and bound each term separately. Clearly, EX [I|Xs|=0] = PX [Bm,ps = 0] = (1− ps)m.
On the other hand, by looking up the moment generating function of a binomial distribution we
have
EX [I|Xs|≥2/β
e2
4
β2e−β|Xs|] ≤ e
2
4
β2EX [e−β|Xs|] =
e2
4
β2(1− (1− e−β)ps)m . (53)
The remaining term is bounded by
EX
[
I1≤|Xs|<2/β
1
|Xs|2
]
≤ EX
[
I1≤|Xs|
1
|Xs|2
]
. (54)
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Therefore, applying Lemma 24 and upper bounding some negative terms by zero, we get
EX
[
max
k≥0
e−kβ
max{|Xs| − k, 1}2
]
≤ 6
p2s(m+ 1)(m+ 2)
+
e2β2
4
(1− (1− e−β)ps)m . (55)
Now we can combine Lemmas 22 and 25 using Equation 49 to get our final result.
Theorem 26. Let S0 = {s ∈ S|ps = 0} and S+ = S \S0. Let C = αRmax‖(Γ1/2Φ)†‖‖Γ1/2Φ‖F /(1−
γ). Suppose β ≤ 2. Then we have the following:
EX,η[JwX(θˆwX)−JwX(θwX)] ≤ C2
∑
s∈S0
ws +
∑
s∈S+
ws
(
6
p2s(m+ 1)(m+ 2)
+
e2β2
4
(1− (1− e−β)ps)m
) .
The following version is the one given in the paper for reasons of space. It is easily obtained by
noting that e2/4 ≤ 6, m2 ≤ (m+ 1)(m+ 2), and when β ≤ 1/2 then 1− (1− e−β)ps ≤ 1− βps/2.
Corollary 27. Let S0 = {s ∈ S|ps = 0} and S+ = S\S0. Let C = αRmax‖(Γ1/2Φ)†‖‖Γ1/2Φ‖F /(1−
γ). Suppose β ≤ 1/2. Then EX,η[JwX(θˆwX)− JwX(θwX)] is upper bounded by:
C2
∑
s∈S0
ws + 6
∑
s∈S+
ws
(
1
p2sm
2
+ β2
(
1− βps
2
)m) .
The following is an immediate consequence of these results.
Corollary 28. If ws = 0 for all s ∈ S0, then EX,η[JwX(θˆwX)− JwX(θwX)] = O(1/m2).
E Utility Analysis of DP-LSL
The analysis in this section follows a scheme similar to the previous one. We start by taking the
expectation of the excess empirical risk with respect to the Gaussian perturbation η.
Lemma 29.
EX,η[JλX(θˆλX)− JλX(θλX)] = EX
[(
λd
2m
+
1
m
∑
s∈S
ρs‖φs‖22|Xs|
)
σ2X
]
. (56)
Proof. Let X be an arbitrary dataset with m trajectories. Recalling that θˆλX = θ
λ
X + η we get:
JλX(θˆ
λ
X)− JλX(θλX) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
∑
s∈Sxi
ρs
(
(φ>s θˆ
λ
X)
2 − (φ>s θλX)2 − 2Fxi,sφ>s η
)
+
λ
2m
(
‖θˆλX‖22 − ‖θλX‖22
)
=
1
m
m∑
i=1
∑
s∈Sxi
ρs
(
η>φsφ>s η + 2η
>φsφ>s θ
λ
X − 2Fxi,sφ>s η
)
+
λ
2m
(
‖η‖22 + 2η>θλX
)
.
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Taking the expectation over η ∼ N (0, σ2XI) in the above expression we get
Eη[JλX(θˆλX)− JλX(θλX)] =
1
m
m∑
i=1
∑
s∈Sxi
ρs Tr(φsφ
>
s )σ
2
X +
λ
2m
dσ2X .
The result now follows from noting that
∑m
i=1
∑
s∈Sxi ρs Tr(φsφ
>
s ) =
∑
s∈S ρs‖φs‖22|Xs|.
In order to bound the expression given by previous lemma we will expand the definition of σX =
Cλ
√
ψλX , with Cλ = 2Rmax‖Φ‖/(1 − γ)(λ − ‖Φ‖2‖ρ‖∞), and note that using the straightforward
bound (a+ b)2 ≤ 2a2 + 2b2 we have:
ψλX = max
k≥0
e−kβ
‖ρ‖2 + ‖Φ‖‖ρ‖∞√
2λ
√∑
s∈S
ρs min{|Xs|+ k,m}
2
≤ 2‖ρ‖22 +
‖Φ‖2‖ρ‖2∞
λ
∑
s∈S
ρs max
k≥0
(
e−2kβ min{|Xs|+ k,m}
)
.
The following lemma can be used to bound the maximums inside this sum.
Lemma 30. Suppose a ≥ 0 and b > 0. Then the following holds:
max
0≤x≤m−a
e−2bx(a+ x) =

a b < a/2
me−2b(m−a) b > m/2
1
2ebe
2ab otherwise
(57)
Assuming we have 2β < 1 ≤ m, previous lemma yields:
max
k≥0
(
e−2kβ min{|Xs|+ k,m}
)
= |Xs|I|Xs|>2β +
1
2eβ
e2β|Xs|I|Xs|≤2β ≤ |Xs|+
1
2eβ
I|Xs|=0 . (58)
When taking the expectation of the upper bound for (56) obtained by plugging in (58), several
quantities involving products of correlated binomial random variables will appear. Next lemma
gives expressions for all these expectations.
Lemma 31. Recall that ps = P[s ∈ x] and |Xs| is a binomial random variable with m trials and
success probability ps. Define ps,s′ = P[s ∈ x∧ s′ ∈ x] and p¯s,s′ = P[s ∈ x∧ s′ /∈ x] for any s, s′ ∈ S.
Then we have the following:
1. E[|Xs|] = mps,
2. E[I|Xs|=0] = (1− ps)m,
3. E[|Xs|2] = m2p2s +m(ps − p2s),
4. E[|Xs||Xs′ |] = m(m− 1)psps′ +mps,s′,
5. E[|Xs|I|Xs′ |=0] = mp¯s,s′(1− ps′)m−1.
Proof. All equations follow from straightforward calculations.
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Theorem 32. Suppose β < 1/2 and λ > ‖Φ‖2‖ρ‖∞. Let Cλ = 2αRmax‖Φ‖/(1−γ)(λ−‖Φ‖2‖ρ‖∞).
Then we have
EX,η[JλX(θˆλX)− JλX(θλX)] ≤ C2λ
{∑
s∈S
ρsps
(
d‖Φ‖2‖ρ‖2∞
2
+ 2‖ρ‖22‖φs‖22
)
+
λ
m
d‖ρ‖22 +
1
m
d‖Φ‖2‖ρ‖2∞
4eβ
∑
s∈S
ρs(1− ps)m + m
λ
‖Φ‖2‖ρ‖2∞
∑
s,s′∈S
ρsρs′psps′‖φs‖22
+
1
λ
‖Φ‖2‖ρ‖2∞
∑
s∈S
ρ2s‖φs‖22(ps − p2s) +
∑
s,s′∈S
s 6=s′
ρsρs′‖φs‖22
(
ps,s′ − psps′ + 1
2eβ
p¯s,s′(1− ps′)m−1
)
 .
Proof. Combining Lemma 29 with (58) and the definition of σ2X yields the following upper bound
for EX,η[JλX(θˆλX)− JλX(θλX)]:
C2λEX
[(
λd
2m
+
1
m
∑
s∈S
ρs‖φs‖22|Xs|
)(
2‖ρ‖22 +
‖Φ‖2‖ρ‖2∞
λ
∑
s∈S
ρs
(
|Xs|+ 1
2eβ
I|Xs|=0
))]
.
Terms that do not involve products of the form |Xs||Xs′ | or |Xs|I|Xs′ |=0 can be straightforwardly
reduced to linear combinations of expectations in Lemma 31. The remaining term yields the
following:
EX
 ∑
s,s′∈S
ρsρs′‖φs‖22|Xs|
(
|Xs′ |+ 1
2eβ
I|Xs′ |=0
)
=
∑
s∈S
ρ2s‖φs‖22EX
[
|Xs|
(
|Xs|+ 1
2eβ
I|Xs|=0
)]
+
∑
s,s′∈S
s 6=s′
ρsρs′‖φs‖22EX
[
|Xs|
(
|Xs′ |+ 1
2eβ
I|Xs′ |=0
)]
=
∑
s∈S
ρ2s‖φs‖22
(
m2p2s +m(ps − p2s)
)
+
∑
s,s′∈S
s6=s′
ρsρs′‖φs‖22
(
m(m− 1)psps′ +mps,s′ + 1
2eβ
mp¯s,s′(1− ps′)m−1
)
,
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where we used Lemma 31 again. Thus we get:
EX,η[JλX(θˆλX)− JλX(θλX)] ≤ C2λ
{
λd‖ρ‖22
m
+
d‖Φ‖2‖ρ‖2∞
2m
∑
s∈S
ρs
(
mps +
1
2eβ
(1− ps)m
)
+
2‖ρ‖22
m
∑
s∈S
ρsps‖φs‖22m+
‖Φ‖2‖ρ‖2∞
λm
∑
s∈S
ρ2s‖φs‖22
(
m2p2s +m(ps − p2s)
)
+
‖Φ‖2‖ρ‖2∞
λm
∑
s,s′∈S
s 6=s′
ρsρs′‖φs‖22
(
m(m− 1)psps′ +mps,s′ + 1
2eβ
mp¯s,s′(1− ps′)m−1
)
The final result is obtained by grouping the terms in this expression by their dependence in λ and
m.
Note that if we take λ = ω(1) with respect to m in the above theorem, then Cλ = O(1/λ) and
we get the following corollary.
Corollary 33. Suppose λ = ω(1) with respect to m. Then we have
EX,η[JλX(θˆλX)− JλX(θλX)] = O
(
1
λm
+
1
λ2
+
m
λ3
)
. (59)
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